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We present an analysis about subsidy (or tax) policy for adoption of new
technology in a duopoly with a homogeneous good. Technology itself is free.
However, firms must expend fixed set-up costs for adoption of new technol-
ogy, for example, education costs of their staffs. We assume linear demand
function, and consider two types of cost functions of firms. Quadratic cost
functions and linear cost functions. There are various cases of optimal poli-
cies depending on the level of the set-up cost and the forms of cost functions.
In particular, under linear cost functions there is the following case.
The social welfare is maximized when one firm adopts new technol-
ogy, however, both firms adopt new technology without subsidy nor
tax. Then, the government should impose taxes on one firm or both
firms.
Under quadratic cost functions there exists no taxation case. There are subsi-
dization cases both under quadratic and linear cost functions.
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1 Introduction
We present an analysis about subsidy (or tax) policy for adoption of new technology in a
duopoly with a homogeneous good. Technology itself is free. However, firmsmust expend
fixed set-up costs for adoption of new technology, for example, education costs of their
staffs. We assume linear demand function, and consider two types of cost functions of
firms. Quadratic cost functions and linear cost functions. With quadratic cost functions
marginal costs are increasing, and with linear cost functions marginal costs are constant.
There are several references about technology adoption orR&D in duopoly or oligopoly.
Lots of researches focus on the relation between technology licensor and licensee. The
difference of means of contracts which are royalties, up-front fees, the combinations of
these two and auction are well discussed (Katz and Shapiro (1985), Kamien and Tauman
(1986), Sen and Tauman (2007)). Kamien and Tauman (1986) shows that if the licen-
sor does not have production capacity, fixed fee is better than royalty and it is also better
for consumers. This topic under Stackelberg oligopoly is discussed in Kabiraj (2004)
when the licensor does not have production capacity, and discussed in Wang and Yang
(2004), Kabiraj (2005) and Filippini (2005) when the licensor has production capacity. A
Cournot oligopoly with fixed fee under cost asymmetry is analyzed in La Manna (1993).
He shows that if technologies can be replicated perfectly, a lower-cost firm has always the
incentive to transfer its technology and hence a Cournot-Nash equilibrium cannot be fully
asymmetric, but there exists no non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
On the other hand, using cooperative game theory, Watanabe and Muto (2008) anal-
yses bargaining between licensor with no production capacity and oligopolistic firms. In
recent research, the relation betweenmarket structure and technology improvement is an-
alyzed. Boone (2001) and Matsumura et. al. (2013), respectively, find a non-monotonic
relation between intensity of competition and innovation. Also, Pal (2010) shows that if
we consider technology adoption, Cournot competition makes more social welfare than
Bertrand competition under differentiated goods market. Elberfeld and Nti (2004) ex-
amines the adoption of a new technology in oligopoly, where there is ex-ante uncertainty
about variable costs of the new technology, and shows that if in equilibrium both old and
new technologies are employed, more uncertainty about the new technology increases
(decreases) the number of innovating firms and decreases (increases) the product price
if the up-front investment is large (small). Zhang et. al. (2014) analyzes the effect of
information spillovers when the outcome of R&D is uncertain in a two-stage Cournot
oligopoly model where a subset of firms first make a choice between two alternative pro-
duction technologies independently and then all firms compete in quantity.
This paper analyzes optimal subsidization or taxation policies about adoption of new
technology by firms in a duopoly with a homogeneous good. We consider the following
three-stage game.
(1) The first stage: The government determines the level of subsidies (or taxes) to the
firms.
(2) The second stage: The firms decide whether they adopt new technology or not.
(3) The third stage: The firms determine their outputs.
The social welfare is defined to be consumers’ surplus plus firms’ profits, which is equal to
consumers’ utility minus productions costs including the set-up costs of new technology.
Subsidies to the firms are financed by lump-sum taxes on the consumers, and revenues
from taxes on the firms are transfered to the consumers in a lum-summanner. These lump-
sum taxes and transfers are not related to the good of this industry. Excluding income
effects they do not affect the demand for the good, and they are canceled out in the social
welfare.
There are various cases about optimal policies depending on the level of the set-up cost
and the forms of cost functions. Under quadratic cost functions there are the following
cases.
(1) The social welfare is maximized when both firms adopt new technology, but only
one firm adopts new technology without subsidy. Then, the government should give
subsidies to the firms. There are two subsidization schemes.
a) The government gives a subsidy to one of the firms, and this firm adopts new
technology. The other firm does not adopt new technology. It is a discrimina-
tory policy.
b) The government gives chances to receive subsidies to both firms, but actually
only one firm receives a subsidy and adopts new technology. It is not a discrim-
inatory policy.
In both schemes only one firm adopts new technology.
(2) The social welfare is maximized when both firms adopt new technology, and they
adopt new technology without subsidy. Then, the government should do nothing.
Under linear cost functions there are the following cases.
(1) The social welfare is maximized when one firm adopts new technology, however,
both firms adopt new technology without subsidy nor tax. Then, the government
should impose taxes for new technology adoption on one firm, or both firms. There
are the following two taxation schemes.
a) The government imposes a tax on one firm to prevent adoption of new tech-
nology. It is a discriminatory policy.
b) The government imposes taxes on both firms. At the equilibrium only one of
the firms adopts new technology and this firm actually pays a tax. The other
firm does not adopt. It is not a discriminatory policy because adoption of new
technology is a choice of the firm.
In both schemes only one firm adopts new technology.
(2) The social welfare is maximized when one firm adopts new technology, and only one
firm adopts new technology without subsidy nor tax. Then, the government should
do nothing.
Under quadratic cost functions there exists no taxation case.
Note that our model is (at least mathematically) equivalent to a model of technology
license with a fixed license fee.
2 Themodel
Two firms, Firm A and B, produce a homogeneous good, and consider adoption of new
technology from a foreign country. Technology itself is free, but each firm must expend a
fixed set-up cost, for example, education cost of its staff. Denote the outputs of Firm A
and B by xA and xB , the price of the good by p. The utility function of consumers is
u D a.xA C xB/   1
2
.xA C xB/2;
where a is a positive constant. The inverse demand function is derived as follows.
p D a   xA   xB :
(1) Under quadratic cost functions the cost functions of the firms before adoption of
new technology are cx2i ; i D A;B , and the cost functions after adoption of new
technology are 1
2
cx2i ; i D A:B . A fixed set-up cost is e.
(2) Under linear cost functions the cost functions of the firms before adoption of new
technology are cxi ; i D A;B , and the cost of each firm after adoption of new tech-
nology is zero. A fixed set-up cost is also e.
c in both cost functions and e are positive constants and common to both firms. There
exists no fixed cost other than the set-up costs.
The social welfare W is defined to be the sum of consumers’ surplus and firms’ profits,
which is equal to consumers’ utility minus productions costs including the set-up costs of
new technology, as follows;
W Da.xA C xB/   1
2
.xA C xB/2   p.xA C xB/C p.xA C xB/   cA.xA/   cB.xB/
Da.xA C xB/   1
2
.xA C xB/2   cA.xA/   cB.xB/
cA.xA/ and cB.xB/ generally denote the cost functions of firms. They may include set-up
costs.
Subsidies to the firms are financed by lump-sum taxes on the consumers, and revenues
from taxes on the firms are transfered to the consumers in a lum-summanner. These lump-
sum taxes and transfers are not related to the good of this industry. Excluding income
effects they do not affect the demand for the good, and they are canceled out in the social
welfare.
We analyze the optimal subsidization or taxation policies of the government for adop-
tion of new technology by firms. If adoption of new technology and non-adoption are
indifferent for a firm, then it adopts new technology.
3 Quadratic cost functions
In this section firms have quadratic cost functions. The profits of Firm A and B before
adoption of new technology are
A D .a   xA   xB/xA   cx2A; B D .a   xA   xB/xB   cx2B :
After adoption of new technology they are
A D .a   xA   xB/xA   1
2
cx2A   e; B D .a   xA   xB/xB  
1
2
cx2B   e:
We assume Cournot type behavior of firms. There are four cases.
(1) The conditions for profit maximization when no firm adopts new technology are
a   2xA   xB   2cxA D 0; a   xA   2xB   2cxB D 0:
We denote the equilibrium outputs as follows;
x0A D x0B D
a
2c C 3;
and the equilibrium profits by
0A D 0B D
.c C 1/a2
.2c C 3/2 :
(2) The conditions for profit maximization when both firms adopt new technology are
a   2xA   xB   cxA D 0; a   xA   2xB   cxB D 0:
We denote the equilibrium outputs as follows;
QxA D QxB D a
c C 3:
and the equilibrium profits by
QA D QB D .c C 2/a
2
2.c C 3/2   e:
(3) If only Firm A adopts new technology, the conditions for profit maximization are
a   2xA   xB   cxA D 0; a   xA   2xB   2cxB D 0:
We denote the equilibrium outputs as follows;
xAA D
.c C 2/a2
2c2 C 6c C 3; x
A
B D
.c C 1/a
2c2 C 6c C 3:
and the equilibrium profits by
AA D
.c C 2/.2c C 1/2a2
2.2c2 C 6c C 3/2   e; 
A
B D
.c C 1/3a2
.2c2 C 6c C 3/2 :
(4) If only Firm B adopts new technology, the equilibrium outputs are written as;
xBA D
.c C 1/a
2c2 C 6c C 3; x
B
B D
.c C 2/a2
2c2 C 6c C 3:
and the equilibrium profits as
BA D
.c C 1/3a2
.2c2 C 6c C 3/2 ; 
B
B D
.c C 2/.2c C 1/2a2
2.2c2 C 6c C 3/2   e:
Let
e1 D QA C e   BA D QB C e   AB D
.2c4 C 14c3 C 36c2 C 40c C 15/a2c
2.2c C 3/2.2c2 C 6c C 3/2 ;
e0 D AA C e   0A D BB C e   0B D
.8c4 C 40c3 C 72c2 C 56c C 15/a2c
2.2c C 3/2.2c2 C 6c C 3/2 :
If e  e1, the best response to adoption is adoption. If e > e1, the best response to
adoption is non-adoption. If e  e0, the best response to non-adoption is adoption. If
e > e0, the best response to non-adoption is non-adoption.
We find
e0   e1 D .c C 2/.8c
3 C 38c2 C 54c C 27/c2a2
2.c C 3/2.2c C 3/2.2c2 C 6c C 3/2 > 0:
The game after the second stage is depicted as follows.
B
adoption of
new technology
non-adoption
adoption of QB   e AB
A new technology QA   e AA   e
BB   e 0Bnon-adoption
BA 
0
A
The sub-game perfect equilibria are as follows.
Lemma 1. (1) If e  e1, the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state such that both firms
adopt new technology. In this case e  e1 and e  e0, so adoption of new technology
is a dominant strategy for each firm.
(2) If e1 < e  e0, the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state such that one firm, Firm
A or B, adopts new technology. In this case e  e0 and e > e1, so adoption of new
technology is a best response to non-adoption, and non-adoption is a best response
to adoption.
(3) If e > e0, the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state such that no firm adopts new
technology. In this case e > e0 and e > e1, so non-adoption is a dominant strategy
for both firms.
Socialwelfare Denote the social welfare when both firms adopt new technology byW 2,
that when one firm adopts new technology by W 1 and that when no firm adopts new
technology by W 0. Then, we have
W 2 D .c C 4/a
2
.c C 3/2   2e; W
1 D .6c
3 C 27c2 C 27c C 8/a2
2.2c2 C 6c C 3/2   e; W
0 D 2.c C 2/a
2
.2c C 3/2 :
Let
e0a D
.8c4 C 52c3 C 102c2 C 71c C 15/a2c
2.2c C 3/2.2c2 C 6c C 3/2 ;
e1a D
.2c4 C 17c3 C 45c2 C 43c C 15/
2.c C 3/2.2c2 C 6c C 3/2 :
We have W 0 D W 1 when e D e0a, W 1 D W 2 when e D e1a, W 0 > W 1 (or W 1 > W 0)
when e > e0a (or e < e
0
a) and W
1 > W 2 (or W 2 > W 1) when e > e1a (or e < e
1
a). We can
show
e0a   e1a D
.c2 C 7c C 9/.4c2 C 14c C 9/a2c2
.c C 3/2.2c C 3/2.2c2 C 6c C 3/2 > 0:
Thus, the following lemma is derived.
Lemma 2. (1) If e  e1a, W 2 is the maximum, and adoption of new technology by both
firms is optimal.
(2) If e1a < e  e0a, W 1 is the maximum, and adoption of new technology by one firm is
optimal.
(3) If e > e0a, W
0 is the maximum, and non-adoption of new technology by any firm is
optimal.
Now we find
e1a   e0 D
.4c4 C 18c3 C 17c2   18c   27/a2c2
2.c C 3/2.2c C 3/2.2c2 C 6c C 3/2 :
This is positive for reasonable value of c. For example, if c > 1:07, e1a   e0 > 0. Then, we
obtain the following results.
Theorem 1. Under quadratic cost functions the optimal policies should be as follows.
(1) If e  e1, W 2 is optimal and both firms adopt new technology without subsidy. The
government should do nothing.
(2) If e1 < e  e0, W 2 is optimal but one firm adopts new technology without subsidy.
The government should give subsidies to both firms. The level of the subsidy must not
be smaller than e   e1. If the government gives a subsidy to only one firm, the other
firm does not adopt new technology. Thus, in this case the government should give
the subsidies to both firms.
(3) If e0 < e  e1a, W 2 is optimal and no firm adopts new technology without subsidy.
The government should give subsidies to both firms. The level of the subsidy must not
be smaller than e   e1.
(4) If e1a < e  e0a,W 1 is optimal but no firm adopts new technologywithout subsidy. The
government should give subsidies to the firms. There are two subsidization schemes.
a) The government gives a subsidy to one of the firms, and this firm adopts new
technology. The level of the subsidy must not be smaller than e   e0. The other
firm does not adopt. It is a discriminatory policy.
b) The government gives subsidies to both firms. The level of the subsidy to each
firm is between e   e0 and e   e1. Since at the equilibrium only one firm adopts
new technology, the government actually gives the subsidy to one of the firms. It
is not a discriminatory policy because both firms have chances to receive subsi-
dies.
In both schemes only one firm adopts new technology.
(5) If e > e0a, W
0 is optimal and no firm adopts new technology without subsidy. The
government should do nothing.
4 Linear cost functions
In this section we assume that firms have linear cost functions. Then, the marginal costs
are constant. We use the same symbols as those in the previous section. The profits of
Firm A and B before adoption of new technology are
A D .a   xA   xB/xA   cxA; B D .a   xA   xB/xB   cxB :
After adoption of new technology they are
A D .a   xA   xB/xA   e; B D .a   xA   xB/xB   e:
We assume Cournot type behavior of firms, and assume a > 2c. There are four cases.
(1) The conditions for profit maximization when no firm adopts new technology are
a   2xA   xB   c D 0; a   xA   2xB   c D 0:
The equilibrium outputs and profits are
x0A D x0B D
a   c
3
; 0A D 0B D
.a   c/2
9
:
(2) The conditions for profit maximization when both firms adopt new technology are
a   2xA   xB D 0; a   xA   2xB D 0:
The equilibrium outputs and profits are
QxA D QxB D a
3
; QA D QB D a
2
9
  e:
(3) If only Firm A adopts new technology, the conditions for profit maximization are
a   2xA   xB D 0; a   xA   2xB   c D 0:
The equilibrium outputs and profits are
xAA D
aC c
3
; xAB D
a   2c
3
; AA D
.aC c/2
9
  e; AB D
.a   2c/2
9
:
(4) If only Firm B adopts new technology, the equilibrium outputs and profits are
xBA D
a   2c
3
; xBB D
aC c
3
; BA D
.a   2c/2
9
; BB D
.aC c/2
9
  e:
Let
e1 D QA C e   BA D QB C e   AB D
4.a   c/c
9
;
e0 D AA C e   0A D BB C e   0B D
4ac
9
:
Clearly, e0 > e1. Thus, similarly to Lemma 1 the sub-game perfect equilibria of the game
after the second stage are as follows.
Lemma 3. (1) If e  e1, the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state such that both firms
adopt new technology. In this case e  e1 and e  e0, so adoption of new technology
is a dominant strategy for each firm.
(2) If e1 < e  e0, the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state such that one firm, Firm
A or B, adopts new technology. In this case e  e0 and e > e1, so adoption of new
technology is a best response to non-adoption, and non-adoption is a best response
to adoption.
(3) If e > e0, the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state such that no firm adopts new
technology. In this case e > e0 and e > e1, so non-adoption is a dominant strategy
for both firms.
Social welfare The social welfare are obtained as follows;
W 2 D 4a
2
9
  2e; W 1 D 8a
2   8ac C 11c2
18
  e; W 0 D 4.a   c/
2
9
:
Let
e0a D
.8aC 3c/c
18
; e1a D
.8a   11c/c
18
:
Then, W 0 D W 1 when e D e0a, W 1 D W 2 when e D e1a, W 0 > W 1 (or W 1 > W 0) when
e > e0a (or e < e
0
a) and W
1 > W 2 (or W 2 > W 1) when e > e1a (or e < e
1
a). Clearly,
e0a > e
1
a. Similarly to Lemma 2 we get the following lemma.
Lemma 4. (1) If e  e1a, W 2 is the maximum, and adoption of new technology by both
firms is optimal.
(2) If e1a < e  e0a, W 1 is the maximum, and adoption of new technology by one firm is
optimal.
(3) If e > e0a, W
0 is the maximum, and non-adoption of new technology by any firm is
optimal.
Comparing e0, e1, e0a and e
1
a, we find
e1a < e
1 < e0 < e0a:
This is different from the result in the previous section. Under quadratic cost functions
we have e1 < e0 < e1a < e
0
a.
We obtain the following results.
Theorem 2. Under linear cost functions the optimal policies should be as follows.
(1) If e  e1a, W 2 is optimal and both firms adopt new technology without subsidy nor
tax. The government should do nothing.
(2) If e1a < e  e1, W 1 is optimal but both firms adopt new technology without subsidy
nor tax. The government should impose taxes for new technology adoption to one
firm, or to both firms. There are the following two taxation schemes.
a) The government imposes a tax on one firm, Firm A or B, to prevent adoption
of new technology. The level of the tax must be larger than e1   e. It is a dis-
criminatory policy. When one of the firms does not adopt, the other firm has an
incentive to adopt.
b) The government imposes taxes on both firms. The level of the tax on each firm
is between e1   e and e0   e. Then, at the equilibrium one of the firms adopts
new technology and this firm actually pays a tax. The other firm does not adopt.
It is not a discriminatory policy because adoption of new technology is a choice
of the firm.
In both schemes only one firm adopts new technology.
(3) If e1 < e  e0, W 1 is optimal and only one firm adopts new technology without
subsidy nor tax. The government should do nothing.
(4) If e0 < e  e0a, W 1 is optimal but no firm adopts new technology without subsidy
nor tax. The government should give subsidies to both firms. The level of the subsidy
must not be smaller than e   e0. Since only one firm adopts new technology with
this level of the subsidy, the government actually gives the subsidy to one of the firms
which adopts new technology. However, it gives chances to receive subsidies to both
firms. It is not a discriminatory policy.
Similarly to Theorem 1 there exists another discriminatory subsidization scheme such
that the government gives a subsidy to only one firm.
(5) If e > e0a,W
0 is optimal and no firm adopts new technology without subsidy nor tax.
The government should do nothing.
Remarkable results are (2) and (3) of this theorem. In (2) adoption of new technology
by only one firm is optimal for the society, however both firms have incentives to adopt
new technology. Thus, the government must impose taxes on one of the firms or to both
firms so as to prevent adoption by one firm. On the other hand, in (2) of Theorem 1
adoption of new technology by both firms is optimal, but only one firm has an incentive to
adopt. Thus, the government give subsidies to the firms. In (3) of this theorem adoption of
new technology by one firm is optimal, and only one firm has an incentive to adopt. Thus,
the government should do nothing. On the other hand, in (3) of Theorem 1 adoption
of new technology by both firms is optimal, however no firm has an incentive to adopt.
Therefore, the government give subsidies to the firms. (1), (4) and (5) are the same as
those in Theorem 1.
In the future research we want to generalize the analyses in this paper to a case of
general demand and cost functions.
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